

Message Text

SECRET

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ACTION NODS-00

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /001 W
-----272010Z 091755 /65
Z 271958Z MAY 77 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 3291

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 PARIS 15816

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FOR TARNOFF FROM GELB

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1
TAGS: PARM, FR
SUBJECT: SALT; CONVENTIONAL ARMS TRANSFERS; AND BERLIN

1. IN CONVERSATION WITH DE LABOULAYE MAY 27, HE OUT-
LINED SOME POINTS WHICH WILL NEED PREPARATORY WORK
PRIOR TO SECRETARY'S DEPARTURE TOMORROW FOR FRANCE.

2. SALT: I OUTLINED OUR SALT DISCUSSIONS IN GENEVA
ALONG THE LINES OF PAUL WARNKE'S BRIEFING TO THE NAC.
DE LABOULAYE WAS APPRECIATIVE OF CLARIFICATIONS ON
SOME POINTS THAT APPARENTLY FRENCH PARMREP AT NATO HAD
GARBLED. LABOULAYE WAS INTERESTED IN (A) HOW
DEEP THE REDUCTIONS MIGHT BE? I CONFIRMED WARNKE'S
STATEMENT RE 10 PERCENT ON OUR PART. (B) HOW CRUISE MISSILES
WOULD BE HANDLED? I RESPONDED THAT WE ARE THINKING OF
2500 FOR AIR LAUNCHED BUT GAVE NO DETAILS ON OTHER
TYPES OF CRUISE MISSILES. (C) POSSIBLE ASSURANCES ON
BACKFIRE. I SAID OUR PARTICULAR INTEREST IS TRAINING
AND PRODUCTION LIMITS. (D) AND HOW ONE MIGHT VERIFY
THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE SS-16 AND SS-20? IN REGARD
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TO SEVERAL QUESTIONS RE VERIFICATION, I RESPONDED THAT
WE WILL PUT OURSELVES IN POSITION BEFORE AGREEMENT IS
REACHED TO HAVE ADEQUATE VERIFICATION. LABOULAYE ALSO
WANTED TO KNOW IF IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE FOR TWO OF THE
THREE ELEMENTS OF THE FRAMEWORK APPROACH TO BE AGREED
WITHOUT THE THIRD. I TOLD HIM THAT THIS IS AN INTE-
GRATED WHOLE. THE FRENCH (LIKE THE BRITISH) RAISED

NON-CIRCUMVENTION. I SAID THAT WE WILL HAVE FULL CONSULTATION ON THIS BEFORE AGREEMENT WITH SOVIET UNION. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THE FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTER MIGHT RAISE THE SAME TYPES OF QUESTIONS.

3. CONVENTIONAL ARMS TRANSFERS: IN THE COURSE OF DISCUSSING THIS SUBJECT, LABOULAYE OUTLINED ON A PERSONAL BASIS HOW HE THOUGHT PRESIDENT GISCARD MAY RESPOND TO PRESIDENT CARTER'S LETTER. STRESSING THAT HIS REMARKS WERE ONLY PERSONAL, LABOULAYE SAID THAT HE THOUGHT GISCARD'S RESPONSES MAY BE POSITIVE TO A FOUR POWER EXPERTS GROUP. HE SAID THAT THE FRENCH FORESAW A POSSIBLE SCENARIO IN WHICH THE FOUR POWERS MEET TO EXPLORE WAYS OF HOW TO APPROACH CONVENTIONAL ARMS RESTRAINTS AND WHAT WOULD CONSTITUTE DIFFICULTIES FOR EACH OF THE FOUR. AFTER THAT DISCUSSION, THE US (TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE VIEWS OF THE OTHER THREE) WOULD MEET WITH THE SOVIETS IN THE WORKING GROUP AGREED TO IN MOSCOW, AND DETERMINE IF THE SOVIETS ARE PREPARED TO DO ANYTHING. IF THE SOVIETS ACCEPT THE IDEA OF PRACTICAL MEASURES, THE FOUR WOULD THEN HAVE TO STUDY WHAT THE SOVIETS ENVISAGE. IF THE SOVIETS REJECT ANY MOVEMENT, THE FOUR WOULD THEN STUDY WHAT MIGHT BE DONE WITHOUT THE SOVIETS. LABOULAYE STRESSED THAT HE THOUGHT THE GOF WOULD BE RELUCTANT TO GO FAR WITHOUT THE SOVIETS.

4. LABOULAYE CONTINUED THAT THE FRENCH HAVE BEEN SOMEWHAT CONFUSED BY WHAT THE US MEANS IN CALLING FOR
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"EXPERTS" TO MEET. HE QUERIED AS TO WHETHER WE HAD IN MIND USING FOREIGN OFFICE OFFICIALS OR ARMAMENTS EXPERTS. HE CLEARLY INDICATED HIS PREFERENCE FOR THE FORMER. I RESPONDED THAT WE HAD IN THE PAST SPOKEN OF FOREIGN OFFICE PEOPLE, BUT I HAD NO DIRECT KNOWLEDGE OF HOW THE PRESIDENT WANTED TO PROCEED.

5. LABOULAYE SAID THAT THOUGH HIS REMARKS ARE PERSONAL, HE BELIEVES THAT PRESIDENT GISCARD INTELLECTUALLY AGREES WITH THE APPROACH OUTLINED ABOVE. HOWEVER, IT REMAINS TO BE SEEN IF HE WILL RESPOND TO PRESIDENT CARTER ALONG THOSE LINES.

6. CONTINUING IN A PERSONAL VEIN, LABOULAYE SAID THAT HE BELIEVED THE CONVENTIONAL ARMS TRANSFER DISCUSSION

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ACTION NODS-00

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /001 W
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FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 3292

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 PARIS 15816

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AND A TWO-WAY STREET DIALOGUE ON ARMS IN NATO ARE LINKED IN THAT THE EUROPEAN DEFENSE INDUSTRY WILL BE AFFECTED BY ANY RESTRAINT ON EXPORTS. THE EFFORT COULD FOUNDER IF THE US PUSHES TOO FAST FOR DISCUSSIONS IN NATO OR FOR A TRANSATLANTIC DIALOGUE WITH THE INDEPENDENT EUROPEAN PROGRAM GROUP (IEPG). LABOULAYE SAID THAT HE DID NOT BELIEVE THAT A USEFUL DIALOGUE ACROSS THE ATLANTIC CAN BEGIN BEFORE THE IEPG HAS SOME TANGIBLE PROJECTS UNDERWAY. FRANCE COULD NOT ACCEPT THAT A DIALOGUE ON THE TWO-WAY STREET CAN TAKE PLACE IN THE NAC. THERE ARE NOW 11 EUROPEAN GOVERNMENTS IN THE IEPG DISCUSSING ARMS CO-PRODUCTION OUTSIDE OF THE NATO CONTEXT. FRANCE MIGHT BE PREPARED TO HAVE SPAIN JOIN EVEN IF IT IS NOT HET IN NATO. THE IEPG IS STILL A FRAGILE ENTITY AND IF THE US PUSHES IT TO GO TOO FAST, IT WILL FALL APART.

7. SOME OF THE SMALL ALLIES IN THE IEPG ARE INTERESTED IN SUBCONTRACTS. FRANCE IS NOT INTERESTED. THE FIRM FRENCH CONVICTION IS THAT THE IEPG MUST LEAD TO A VIABLE EUROPEAN DEFENSE INDUSTRY, CLOSELY COORDINATED AMONG THE EUROPEAN ALLIES.

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8. DE LABOULAYE SAID THAT HE UNDERSTOOD THAT THE GERMANS

ARE BRIEFING GENSCHER TO DISCUSS THIS AT THE FOUR POWER MINISTERIAL ON TUESDAY. THE FRENCH WILL BRIEF GUIRINGAUD. THUS, THE MATTER MAY WELL COME UP.

9. IN LONDON THE BRITISH (MOBERLY AND HIBBERT) INDICATED THAT CALLAGHAN WOULD ACCEPT THE PRESIDENT'S ARMS EXPORTS GROUP PROPOSAL.

10. BERLIN: IN CLOSING LABOULAYE NOTED HIS DISMAY THAT THE FACT OF THE SOVIET DEMARCHES ON BERLIN PATROLS HAD LEAKED. HE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THERE WAS NO WAY TO QUIET THE MATTER, BUT EXPRESSED STRONG DISMAY AT WHAT HE DESCRIBED AS A BRITISH INCLINATION TO EXPAND ON THE AMOUNT OF INFORMATION THAT IS ALREADY IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN. HE SAID THAT HE BELIEVED THAT THE ALLIES SHOULD NOT CONFIRM THE STORY.
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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
Capture Date: 01-Jan-1994 12:00:00 am
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
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Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Sent Date: 27-May-1977 12:00:00 am
Decaption Date: 22 May 2009
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 22 May 2009
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1977PARIS15816
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: X1
Errors: N/A
Expiration:
Film Number: N770003-0538
Format: TEL
From: PARIS
Handling Restrictions:
Image Path:
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Legacy Key: link1977/newtext/t1977059/aaaaahrd.tel
Line Count: 187
Litigation Code IDs:
Litigation Codes:
Litigation History:
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Message ID: 4972179a-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Office: ACTION NODS
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: STADIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: NODIS
Page Count: 4
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: STADIS
Reference: n/a
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
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Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 2630246
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: SALT; CONVENTIONAL ARMS TRANSFERS; AND BERLIN
TAGS: PARM, PGOV, GE, FR, US, UR, UK
To: STATE
Type: TE
vdkgvwkey: odbc://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/4972179a-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
22 May 2009
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 22 May 2009